AI Agent Security
AI agent security for the agents you already run and the ones your teams are building.
Your teams have built agents in Copilot Studio, Microsoft Foundry and custom code, and connected them to SharePoint, email and business systems through connectors and MCP servers. We find out what each agent can reach and do, set up the security controls that new agents inherit, and keep testing them as models and agents change.
Updated November 2026
The problem
Why AI agents need a security review of their own.
Agents act with real access
An agent reads content and then acts with whatever access it holds: a service principal, an OAuth token with broad scopes, or the connection of the person who built it. Copilot Studio warns that an agent shared with the maker's own credentials lets anyone who uses it act with the maker's access.
Instructions hide in documents and email
A language model cannot reliably tell its user's instructions from instructions planted in a file, an email or a tool result. In June 2025 researchers showed that one crafted email could make Microsoft 365 Copilot send data out through images it fetched on its own (EchoLeak, CVE-2025-32711). Microsoft fixed it on its side.
Agents reach more data than anyone meant
An agent that acts for a user sees what that user can open, and years of sites shared with the whole company make that a lot. Agents built in Microsoft Foundry before agent identities arrived share one project identity, so every agent in the project has the same permissions.
MCP servers and connectors widen the reach
Each MCP server or connector adds tools the agent can call and text the model reads. A server can change a tool's description after you approve it, and in September 2025 the npm package postmark-mcp began copying every email sent through it to an attacker after 15 clean versions.
Why now
Why now: OpenAI released GPT-6 Cyber on 5 November 2026.
On 5 November 2026 OpenAI released GPT-6 Cyber, a model tuned for security work. OpenAI says it rated the model Critical for cybersecurity under its Preparedness Framework, its highest risk level for cyber capabilities. It is limiting access to vetted customers in Daybreak Red, its program for exploit development and authorized security testing. OpenAI also says its researchers used the model to find 81 previously unknown high-severity vulnerabilities in Firefox, and Mozilla has started fixing them.
For a company that runs agents, the practical question is what someone with tools like this could reach through them. Many of the agent incidents of 2025 and 2026 needed no software bug, only an agent with too much access reading text an attacker wrote. The audit below answers that question for each agent you run.
- Fortune, OpenAI debuts new cybersecurity-focused AI model amid growing alarm about AI-driven cyber attacks (5 November 2026)
- The Register, OpenAI releases GPT-6 Cyber, and promises this one stays within rules of engagement (5 November 2026)
- The Next Web, OpenAI's GPT-6 Cyber found 81 new Firefox flaws and is rated Critical (5 November 2026)
How we help
Three ways we help with AI agent security.
Most companies start with the audit, because it shows which agents need attention first. Companies with only a few agents live often start with the foundation instead. Ongoing testing can follow either one.
For agents already running
AI agent security audit
A review of the Copilot Studio, Microsoft Foundry and custom agents you run today, and the MCP servers and connectors they use. You get ranked findings and a remediation plan.
OpenBefore more agents go live
Security foundation for AI agents
The registry, agent identities, tool gateway, guardrails, approvals, data protection, logging and incident runbook that every new agent inherits.
OpenAfter launch
Ongoing agent security
Adversarial testing when models and agents change, a security review before each new agent is published, and regular monitoring reports.
OpenSecurity audit
AI agent security audit, for agents already running.
We review the agents in scope, whether built in Copilot Studio, in Microsoft Foundry (formerly Azure AI Foundry) or in your own code, together with the MCP servers and connectors they call. We work with the access your IT lead grants and run attacks only where you approve them in writing. The audit ends with ranked findings and a remediation plan.
Inventory and owners
Every agent we can find, from the Agent Registry in the Microsoft 365 admin center, Power Platform environments, Foundry projects and your code repositories, each with a named owner, its purpose and who uses it. Agents without an owner go to the top of the findings.
OpenIdentity and permissions
How each agent signs in and what it is allowed to do: service principals, OAuth scopes, connections that run on the maker's credentials, and Microsoft Entra Agent ID where your agents use it. We compare what each agent may do with what its task needs.
OpenData each agent can reach
SharePoint and Microsoft 365 content shared wider than intended, the knowledge sources and connectors behind each agent, and the findings in Microsoft Purview Data Security Posture Management (DSPM, which replaced DSPM for AI) where your licenses include it.
OpenTesting for injection, misuse and leaks
Prompt injection through documents, email and tool results, attempts to make the agent misuse its tools, and attempts to move data out through links, images, email or tool calls. Tests run against a test copy of the agent where one exists, and we record each attack that worked and what it reached.
OpenMCP servers and connectors
Which servers and connectors each agent may call, who published them, whether tool lists are pinned at approval, and whether each server accepts only tokens issued for it, as the MCP specification (version 2026-07-28) requires.
OpenLogging and audit trail
Whether prompts, tool calls and results are recorded with the agent's identity, who can read those logs, how long they are kept, and whether an SDK writes sensitive content into traces in plain text.
OpenMapping to the frameworks
Each finding mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications for 2026, the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026, the EU AI Act duties that apply to the agent, and ISO/IEC 42001, the international standard for AI management systems.
OpenRanked findings and a remediation plan
Findings ranked by what an attacker could reach and how likely the path is, each with the fix, an owner and the order to do it in. We take your security team through every finding, and the plan becomes the brief for the foundation work if you go on to it.
What we test
What the audit tests, and the framework item each test maps to.
The OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications for 2026, released in December 2025, is our checklist for agent risks. MITRE ATLAS names attacker techniques, which helps your detection engineers write rules for them.
| Risk | What we test | Framework item |
|---|---|---|
| Instructions hidden in content (prompt injection) | Poisoned documents, emails, tickets and tool results sent to the agent, to see whether it follows them | OWASP ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack |
| Tool misuse | Requests that push the agent to use a legitimate tool for harm, or beyond its task | OWASP ASI02 Tool Misuse |
| Identity and privilege abuse | What the agent's credentials allow beyond its task, and what a stolen token would allow | OWASP ASI03 Identity and Privilege Abuse |
| MCP servers, packages and tool descriptions | Who published each server, whether tool lists are pinned, and what changed since approval | OWASP ASI04 Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities |
| Poisoned memory or context | Whether planted text in memory or retrieved content steers later sessions | OWASP ASI06 Memory and Context Poisoning |
| Data leaking out | Every route out of the agent: links, images, email, tool calls and pull requests | MITRE ATLAS AML.T0086, exfiltration through an agent tool call |
| Rogue agents | Whether you can disable an agent, revoke its tokens and block its tool calls quickly | OWASP ASI10 Rogue Agents |
Security foundation
Security foundation for AI agents, before more of them go live.
The foundation is the set of controls every new agent inherits, so no team has to solve security again for its own agent. We set it up in your Microsoft 365, Azure or AWS environment, your security lead approves each change before it goes live, and your team gets a runbook to keep it current.
Agent registry and named owners
One record per agent with a named owner, its purpose, the data it reads, a risk tier and a review date, kept in step with the Agent Registry in the Microsoft 365 admin center. An agent without an owner does not get published.
OpenA separate identity per agent
Each agent gets its own identity, with Microsoft Entra Agent ID where it fits, and only the permissions its task needs. Shared service accounts and maker credentials come out of shared agents, and tokens are short-lived and scoped to one system.
OpenAn allowlist or gateway for MCP servers and tools
Agents reach only the MCP servers and tools on an approved list, enforced at a gateway such as Azure API Management where that fits. Tool lists are pinned at approval, so a server cannot change what a tool says it does without a new review.
OpenGuardrails
Checks on what goes into an agent and what comes out, using Azure AI Content Safety and its Prompt Shields where you build on Azure. Prompt Shields can check documents and email for hidden instructions as well as user prompts, and we make sure that document check is on wherever agents read them.
OpenHuman approval for high-risk actions
A named person approves before an agent sends email outside the company, moves money, deletes records or changes who has access. The approval screen shows the exact action and the recipient.
OpenDLP and sensitivity labels
Microsoft Purview sensitivity labels and data loss prevention (DLP) policies, so confidential content stays away from agents that should not read it and a warning or block appears before it leaves the company.
Logs in your security tools
Agent sign-ins, tool calls and alerts sent to the security tools your team already uses, such as Microsoft Sentinel, with threat protection for AI services in Microsoft Defender for Cloud where agents run on Azure. Analysts see agent activity next to everything else they watch.
OpenIncident runbook for agents
Who decides when an agent misbehaves, how to disable its identity, revoke its tokens, block its tool calls and disconnect its integrations, and what each step leaves running. We rehearse it once with your team on a test agent.
OpenOngoing security
Ongoing agent security, as models and agents change.
An agent that passed its tests last quarter can fail them after a model update, a new tool or a changed prompt, and the platforms change their own classifiers too. Ongoing security keeps the tests running after the audit or the foundation work ends.
Periodic adversarial testing
Injection, tool misuse and data-leak tests rerun after every change to a model, prompt, tool or guardrail, and on a regular schedule with a human tester alongside automated scanners, because attackers adapt and fixed test cases catch less over time.
OpenReview before a new agent is published
A security check on each new agent before it is shared: its identity, its tools and MCP servers, the data it reads and the approvals on its risky actions, with the result recorded in the registry.
OpenMonitoring and reporting
A regular report for your CISO on agents added and retired, test results, blocked tool calls and alerts, open findings, and security patches for the agent platforms and SDKs you run.
OpenFrom your side
What it takes from your side.
Your security lead and IT lead agree with us which admin roles we need and for how long, and remove our access when the work ends. Attacks run against a test copy of each agent where one exists, and against production only with written approval, a time window and a named contact on your side. Each agent owner spends time with us on what the agent is for and who relies on it.
Microsoft, AWS and other licenses stay on your own agreements. A few controls on this page need specific licenses, such as Purview DSPM or Conditional Access for agents, and we tell you which before you buy anything. Legal sign-off on the EU AI Act mapping comes from your counsel.
Proof
Where this work comes from.
We have built on the Microsoft platform since 2014 and been a Microsoft partner since 2015, with more than 200 production deployments on AI and the Microsoft platform and teams in Texas and Munich.
Security operations on Microsoft Sentinel
For a global commercial vehicle manufacturer we set up security operations on Microsoft Sentinel, with KQL detection rules and Logic Apps response playbooks, next to a customer identity program, and trained their engineers to run both.
OpenA European pharmaceutical regulator
An AI compliance scanner in production that has checked more than 620 marketing assets against 11 rules, cutting review from 2 to 3 hours to about 2 minutes per asset.
OpenFrom the guide
From our enterprise AI agents guide.
The guide follows an agent from planning to production on Microsoft, AWS and Google clouds, and every page ends with a dated list of sources. These pages go deeper on the work above.
Security threats to agents
The OWASP agentic top 10, the incidents of 2025 and 2026, and the controls that hold.
OpenPrompt injection
How instructions hidden in content reach an agent, and the defenses that limit the damage.
OpenMCP security
Tool poisoning, token passthrough and the controls the MCP specification leaves to you.
OpenAgent identity and access
Why each agent needs its own identity, and how Entra Agent ID, AgentCore and Google compare.
OpenAI agent registry and sprawl
One record per agent, with an owner, an identity, a risk tier and an approval state.
OpenRed teaming AI agents
What an agent red team covers, from prohibited actions to injection through tools.
OpenSources
Sources for the product and framework facts on this page.
Checked on 5 November 2026. Product names, defaults and licensing change often, so we confirm each one in your own environment.
- OWASP GenAI Security Project, OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications for 2026 (9 December 2025)
- OWASP GenAI Security Project, OWASP GenAI LLM Top 10 2026 (3 August 2026)
- MITRE ATLAS data changelog (28 October 2026)
- Model Context Protocol, Security best practices, specification 2026-07-28
- Microsoft Learn, Microsoft Entra Agent ID key concepts (3 April 2026)
- Microsoft Learn, Agent identity in Microsoft Foundry (28 October 2026)
- Microsoft Learn, Use connectors in Copilot Studio (18 August 2026)
- Microsoft Learn, Agent Registry overview
- Microsoft Learn, Prompt Shields in Azure AI Content Safety (28 August 2026)
- Microsoft Learn, Threat protection for AI services in Microsoft Defender for Cloud (19 May 2026)
- Microsoft Learn, Data Security Posture Management in Microsoft Purview (1 May 2026)
- CVE Program, CVE-2025-32711 (EchoLeak, 11 June 2025)
- The Hacker News, First malicious MCP server found in the wild (postmark-mcp, 29 September 2025)
How it works
What you have at the end.
An agent inventory
Every agent with an owner, its identity, its tools and the data it reads.
Ranked findings
Each one with the evidence, the attack path and the framework item it maps to.
A remediation plan
Fixes in order, each with an owner, agreed with your security lead.
Controls in your environment
Agent identities, tool allowlists, guardrails, approvals and DLP in use, each with an acceptance test your team signed.
An incident runbook
Who decides, how to switch an agent off, and what each step leaves running.
Test results over time
Adversarial test results after each change, in a report your CISO can take to the board.
Our method
From an agreed scope to agents you keep testing.
- First
Scope and sign
We agree which agents, platforms and tests are in scope, the access we need and the acceptance criteria for the work, in writing before anything starts.
- The work
Audit or build
We run the audit and hand over ranked findings and a remediation plan, or set up the foundation controls in your environment with each change approved by your security lead.
- After handover
Keep testing
We rerun the tests when models, tools or agents change, review new agents before they are published and report to your CISO, or hand the runbook to your own team.
Compliance & security
- Built to SOC 2, HIPAA and GDPR standards
- EU AI Act-aligned delivery
- Microsoft Solutions Partner
How we engage
Four ways to work with us.
The audit is the usual first step and ends with a remediation plan you confirm. Each later piece of work has acceptance criteria agreed in writing before it starts, and licenses stay on your own agreements.
Advisory
Strategy, roadmap and readiness for an AI program.
Build
One scoped workflow at a time, with acceptance criteria agreed in writing before the build starts.
Run
Managed operations after launch, measured against those criteria.
Outcome-linked terms
Commercial terms can be tied to the acceptance criteria you sign.
Every engagement starts with one scoped workflow and a written definition of done. Commercial terms are set in the statement of work.
Go deeper
Related solutions
- AI AgentsThe practice that builds agents with their own identity and approval steps
- AI FoundationData, platform, identity and governance built once for every agent
- Managed AI OperationsWe run, monitor and improve agents after launch
- Copilot AI FoundationData controls, AI policy, agent rules and training before Copilot goes company-wide
- AI governancePolicy, registers and controls mapped to the EU AI Act and ISO/IEC 42001
- Copilot Studio implementationOne governed Copilot Studio agent, built and run
- Security maturity scorecardScore your identity, data and endpoint controls before an agent inherits them
- Security and complianceHow we build to SOC 2, HIPAA and GDPR standards
- How we engageAdvisory, build, run and outcome-linked terms
Frequently asked
Questions buyers ask.
What does an AI agent security audit cover?
Every agent in scope and the MCP servers and connectors it calls. We record who owns each agent, how it signs in and what it may do, the data it can reach, how it responds to prompt injection and tool misuse, whether data can leave, and what gets logged. You get findings ranked by risk and mapped to the OWASP agentic top 10, with a remediation plan.
Which agents and platforms do you cover?
Agents built in Copilot Studio, agents in Microsoft Foundry (formerly Azure AI Foundry), custom agents in your own code on Azure or on AWS with Amazon Bedrock AgentCore, and the MCP servers and connectors they use. Agents your staff build in Copilot Chat are in scope when they reach company data.
Will you attack our production agents?
Only with your written approval. We prefer a test copy of each agent with the same tools and permissions. Before any test touches production we agree the test cases, the time window and a contact on your side, and the test payloads use planted data instead of real records.
How is this different from a penetration test?
A penetration test looks for flaws in applications, networks and configuration. An agent audit also tests what the model does with text it reads, such as an email that tells the agent to forward a file or a tool description that changes after approval, which a scan for software bugs will not find. We work alongside your penetration testing provider where you have one.
What is Microsoft Entra Agent ID, and do we need it?
Entra Agent ID gives an AI agent its own identity in Microsoft Entra, separate from user accounts and ordinary service principals, so each agent can have its own permissions, sign-in rules and audit trail. Copilot Studio has created an Entra agent identity for each new agent since July 2026, and new Foundry agents get their own identity with no permissions to start. Some features, such as Conditional Access for agents, need extra licenses, and we tell you which apply.
Why do MCP servers need their own review?
The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is the standard way agents call tools and company systems, and each MCP server adds tools the agent can use and text the model reads. A poisoned tool description or an over-broad token becomes a path into your systems. The current specification (2026-07-28) requires servers to accept only tokens issued for them, and the allowlists, pinned tool lists and approval for writes are up to you.
Can you set up the foundation on AWS as well as Azure?
Yes. On AWS the same controls use Amazon Bedrock AgentCore: AgentCore Identity for agent identities, AgentCore Gateway and AgentCore Policy for which tools an agent may call, and Amazon Bedrock Guardrails for content checks. The registry, approvals, runbook and reporting work the same way on both clouds.
Can you map findings to the EU AI Act and ISO/IEC 42001?
Yes. Each finding and control is recorded against the EU AI Act duties that apply to the agent, such as telling people they are dealing with an AI and, for high-risk uses, logging and human oversight, and against ISO/IEC 42001, the international standard for AI management systems. Your compliance team and auditors get a controls map, and legal advice stays with your counsel.
Research paper
The six-layer AI governance stack: Governance that ships, not governance that stalls
AI governance in six layers, installed as running systems instead of policy binders.
Read the paperWhich of your agents should we look at first?
Every engagement starts with one scoped workflow and a written definition of done. Commercial terms are set in the statement of work.
- Built to SOC 2, HIPAA and GDPR standards
- EU AI Act-aligned delivery
- Microsoft Solutions Partner